@article{cheung2019guide,
  title={{A Guide to Conducting a Meta-Analysis with Non-Independent Effect Sizes}},
  author={Cheung, Mike W-L},
  journal={Neuropsychology review},
  volume={29},
  number={4},
  pages={387--396},
  year={2019},
  publisher={Springer}
}

@article{harrer2019doing,
  title={{Doing Meta-Analysis in R: A Hands-On Guide}},
  author={Harrer, M and Cuijpers, P and Furukawa, TA and Ebert, DD},
  journal={PROTECT Lab Erlangen},
  year={2019},
  doi={10.5281/zenodo.2551803},
  url={https://bookdown.org/MathiasHarrer/Doing_Meta_Analysis_in_R/}
}

@book{borenstein2011introduction,
  title={{Introduction to Meta-Analysis}},
  author={Borenstein, Michael and Hedges, Larry V and Higgins, Julian PT and Rothstein, Hannah R},
  year={2011},
  publisher={John Wiley \& Sons}
}

@article{cheung2014modeling,
  title={{Modeling Dependent Effect Sizes with Three-Level Meta-Analyses: A Structural Equation Modeling Approach}},
  author={Cheung, Mike W-L},
  journal={Psychological Methods},
  volume={19},
  number={2},
  pages={211},
  year={2014},
  publisher={American Psychological Association}
}

@article{veroniki2016methods,
  title={{Methods to Estimate the Between-Study Variance and Its Uncertainty in Meta-Analysis}},
  author={Veroniki, Areti Angeliki and Jackson, Dan and Viechtbauer, Wolfgang and Bender, Ralf and Bowden, Jack and Knapp, Guido and Kuss, Oliver and Higgins, Julian PT and Langan, Dean and Salanti, Georgia},
  journal={Research synthesis methods},
  volume={7},
  number={1},
  pages={55--79},
  year={2016},
  publisher={Wiley Online Library}
}

@article{egger1997bias,
  title={{Bias in Meta-Analysis Detected by A Simple, Graphical Test}},
  author={Egger, Matthias and Smith, George Davey and Schneider, Martin and Minder, Christoph},
  journal={Bmj},
  volume={315},
  number={7109},
  pages={629--634},
  year={1997},
  publisher={British Medical Journal Publishing Group}
}

@article{hardin1968tragedy,
  title={The tragedy of the commons},
  author={Hardin, Garrett},
  journal={science},
  volume={162},
  number={3859},
  pages={1243--1248},
  year={1968},
  publisher={American Association for the Advancement of Science}
}


@InProceedings{cinelli2019sensitivity,
  title = 	 {Sensitivity Analysis of Linear Structural Causal Models},
  author = 	 {Cinelli, Carlos and Kumor, Daniel and Chen, Bryant and Pearl, Judea and Bareinboim, Elias},
  booktitle = 	 {Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Machine Learning},
  pages = 	 {1252--1261},
  year = 	 {2019},
  editor = 	 {Chaudhuri, Kamalika and Salakhutdinov, Ruslan},
  volume = 	 {97},
  series = 	 {Proceedings of Machine Learning Research},
  address = 	 {Long Beach, California, USA},
  month = 	 {09--15 Jun},
  publisher = 	 {PMLR},
  pdf = 	 {http://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/cinelli19a/cinelli19a.pdf},
  url = 	 {http://proceedings.mlr.press/v97/cinelli19a.html},
  abstract = 	 {Causal inference requires assumptions about the data generating process, many of which are unverifiable from the data. Given that some causal assumptions might be uncertain or disputed, formal methods are needed to quantify how sensitive research conclusions are to violations of those assumptions. Although an extensive literature exists on the topic, most results are limited to specific model structures, while a general-purpose algorithmic framework for sensitivity analysis is still lacking. In this paper, we develop a formal, systematic approach to sensitivity analysis for arbitrary linear Structural Causal Models (SCMs). We start by formalizing sensitivity analysis as a constrained identification problem. We then develop an efficient, graph-based identification algorithm that exploits non-zero constraints on both directed and bidirected edges. This allows researchers to systematically derive sensitivity curves for a target causal quantity with an arbitrary set of path coefficients and error covariances as sensitivity parameters. These results can be used to display the degree to which violations of causal assumptions affect the target quantity of interest, and to judge, on scientific grounds, whether problematic degrees of violations are plausible.}
}

@ARTICLE{weingast1981political,
title = {{The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics}},
author = {Weingast, Barry and Shepsle, Kenneth A and Johnsen, Christopher},
year = {1981},
journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
volume = {89},
number = {4},
pages = {642-64},
url = {https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:89:y:1981:i:4:p:642-64}
}

@Article{lee2018court,
  author={Dongwon Lee and Sangwon Park},
  title={{Court-ordered redistricting and the law of 1/n}},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year=2018,
  volume={176},
  number={3},
  pages={507-528},
  month={September},
  keywords={Law of 1/n; Redistricting; Bicameral bargaining; Budget institutions},
  doi={10.1007/s11127-018-0579-4},
  abstract={Abstract This paper examines the effect of redistricting on the law of 1/n, which posits that government spending increases with the number of legislative districts. Our analysis suggests that court-ordered redistricting in the 1960s significantly influenced the 1/n effect, because dividing districts (increasing their number) and merging districts (reducing their number) both reduce public spending. After redistricting, the positive relationship between seats and spending holds for lower chambers in bicameral legislatures. The US experience informs those interested in the design of bicameral institutions about the fiscal implications of legislative apportionment.},
  url={https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v176y2018i3d10.1007_s11127-018-0579-4.html}
}

@Article{bradbury2009spatially,
  author={John Charles Bradbury and E. Frank Stephenson},
  title={{Spatially Targeted Government Spending and Heterogeneous Constituent Cost Shares}},
  journal={Journal of Private Enterprise},
  year=2009,
  volume={24},
  number={Spring 20},
  pages={75-86},
  month={},
  keywords={Political science; Taxation; Public Expenditure; Democracy; Fiscal administration; Costs; Political },
  doi={},
  abstract={No abstract is available for this item.},
  url={https://ideas.repec.org/a/jpe/journl/634.html}
}

@inproceedings{lledo2003electoral,
  title={{Electoral Systems, Legislative Fragmentation and Public Spending: A Comparative Analysis of Brazilian States}},
  author={Lledo, Victor},
  booktitle={meeting of the Latin American Studies Association},
  year={2003}
}

@Article{baqir2002districting,
  author={Reza Baqir},
  title={{Districting and Government Overspending}},
  journal={Journal of Political Economy},
  year={2002},
  volume={110},
  number={6},
  pages={1318-1354},
  month={December},
  keywords={},
  doi={10.1086/342804},
  abstract={Theories of government spending driven by a common-pool problem in the fiscal revenues pool predict that greater districting of a political jurisdiction raises the scale of government. This paper presents evidence on this and related predictions from a cross section of city governments in the United States. The main finding is that, when other plausible determinants of government spending are controlled for, greater districting leads to a considerably greater scale of government activity. The results also show that at-large electoral systems do not, and forms of government that concentrate powers in the office of the executive do, break this relationship.},
  url={https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v110y2002i6p1318-1354.html}
}

@article{matsusaka2005endogeneity,
  title={{The Endogeneity of the Initiative: A Comment on Marschall and Ruhil}},
  author={Matsusaka, John G},
  journal={State Politics \& Policy Quarterly},
  volume={5},
  number={4},
  pages={356--363},
  year={2005},
  publisher={SAGE Publications Sage CA: Los Angeles, CA}
}

@ARTICLE{gilligan2001fiscal,
title = {Fiscal Policy, Legislature Size, and Political Parties: Evidence From State and Local Governments in the First Half of the 20th Century},
author = {Gilligan, Thomas W. and Matsusaka, John},
year = {2001},
journal = {National Tax Journal},
volume = {54},
number = {1},
pages = {57-82},
abstract = {This paper tests whether state and local fiscal policy depended on the number of seats in the legislature in the first half of the 20th century. We find that large legislatures spent more, as implied by the "Law of 1/n" from the fiscal commons/logrolling literature. The same relation appears in the latter half of the century, and therefore seems to be systematic. We also find--again consistent with postwar evidence--that only the size of the upper house was important. We are unable to find robust evidence that expenditure depended on the partisan makeup of the legislature.},
url = {https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ntj:journl:v:54:y:2001:i:1:p:57-82}
}

@article{bradbury2003local,
 ISSN = {00485829, 15737101},
 URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/30025979},
 abstract = {The "Law of l/n" postulates a positive relationship between the number of democratically elected representative districts and government spending. Strong support for this relationship exists in legislatures in the United States (at both the state and national level) and across countries. Few studies have examined this relationship at the local level despite the fact that local governments operate under constraints similar to those faced by representative legislatures. Using a sample of Georgia counties we find the number of county commissioners to be positively correlated with county government expenditures, indicating support for the Law of l/n at the local level.},
 author = {John Charles Bradbury and E. Frank Stephenson},
 journal = {Public Choice},
 number = {1/2},
 pages = {185--198},
 publisher = {Springer},
 title = {Local Government Structure and Public Expenditures},
 volume = {115},
 year = {2003}
}

@article{drew2017price,
author = {Joseph Drew and Brian Dollery},
title ={The Price of Democracy? Political Representation Structure and Per Capita Expenditure in Victorian Local Government},
journal = {Urban Affairs Review},
volume = {53},
number = {3},
pages = {522-538},
year = {2017},
doi = {10.1177/1078087416629806},

URL = { 
        https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087416629806
    
},
eprint = { 
        https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087416629806
    
}
,
    abstract = { Local government systems across the world face acute and ongoing fiscal challenges. In Australia, the regulatory response has focused squarely on council consolidation. This has, unfortunately, meant that comparatively little attention has been paid to alternate, less disruptive methods for enhancing municipal sustainability. One such possibility lies in modifying the structure of local political representation. We conduct a number of estimations on a four-year panel of Victorian municipal data to test whether the “law of 1/n” has empirical support at the local government level. Our results clearly show that the number of geographically defined fragments, or wards, within a given municipality is a statistically significant determinant of local government expenditure. A number of public policy recommendations follow from the empirical evidence that might be broadly applicable to other municipal systems. }
}

@article{kessler2014communication,
 ISSN = {00223808, 1537534X},
 URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/676404},
 abstract = {The paper presents a positive model of policy formation in federal legislatures when delegates engage in the strategic exchange of policy-relevant information. Depending on the type of policy under consideration, communication between delegates generally suffers from a bias that makes truthful communication difficult and sometimes impossible. This generates inefficient federal policy choices that are often endogenously characterized by overspending, universalism, and uniformity. Building on these findings, I develop a theory of fiscal (de-)centralization, which revisits the work of Oates in a world of incomplete information and strategic communication. Empirical results from a cross section of US municipalities are consistent with the predicted pattern of spending.},
 author = {Anke S. Kessler},
 journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
 number = {4},
 pages = {766--805},
 publisher = {The University of Chicago Press},
 title = {Communication in Federal Politics: Universalism, Policy Uniformity, and the Optimal Allocation of Fiscal Authority},
 volume = {122},
 year = {2014}
}

@ARTICLE{bradbury2001legislative,
title = {Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence},
author = {Bradbury, John and Crain, W.},
year = {2001},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
volume = {82},
number = {3},
pages = {309-325},
url = {https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:82:y:2001:i:3:p:309-325}
}

@article{chen2007law,
title={{The Law of \textit{k/n}: The Effect of Chamber Size on Government Spending in Bicameral Legislatures}}, volume={101}, DOI={10.1017/S0003055407070566}, number={4}, journal={American Political Science Review}, publisher={Cambridge University Press}, author={Chen, Jowei and Malhotra, Neil}, year={2007}, pages={657–676}}


@article{primo2006stop,
author = {PRIMO, DAVID M.},
title = {STOP US BEFORE WE SPEND AGAIN: INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON GOVERNMENT SPENDING},
journal = {Economics \& Politics},

volume = {18},
number = {3},
pages = {269-312},
doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00171.x},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00171.x},
eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2006.00171.x},
abstract = {A distributive politics model establishes that the presence of exogenously enforceable spending limits reduces spending and that the effect of executive veto authority is contingent on whether spending is capped and whether the chief executive is a liberal or conservative. Surprisingly, when spending limits are in place, governments with conservative executives spend more than those with more liberal chief executives. Limits are welfare improving, as is the executive veto when it leads to the building of override coalitions. Using 32 years of US state budget data, this paper also establishes empirically that strict balanced budget rules constrain spending and also lead to less pronounced short-term responses to fluctuations in a state's economy. Party variables like divided government and party control of state legislatures tend to have little or no direct effect, with political institutions and economic indicators explaining much of the variation in state spending.},
year = {2006}
}

@book{rodden_2005, place={Cambridge}, series={Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics}, title={Hamilton's Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism}, DOI={10.1017/CBO9780511616075}, publisher={Cambridge University Press}, author={Rodden, Jonathan A.}, year={2005}, collection={Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics}}


@techreport{stein1998institutional,
 title = "Institutional Arrangements and Fiscal Performance: The Latin American Experience",
 author = "Stein, Ernesto and Talvi, Ernesto and Grisanti, Alejandro",
 institution = "National Bureau of Economic Research",
 type = "Working Paper",
 series = "Working Paper Series",
 number = "6358",
 year = "1998",
 month = "January",
 doi = {10.3386/w6358},
 URL = "http://www.nber.org/papers/w6358",
 abstract = {This paper explores the links between institutional arrangements and fiscal performance in" Latin America.  We consider four measures of fiscal performance, namely expenditures, the size of fiscal deficits and debt, and the response of fiscal policy to business" fluctuations; and two institutional dimensions, namely, electoral systems and budgetary processes. " We find evidence that electoral systems characterized by a large degree of proportionality large district magnitude, tend to have larger governments, larger deficits and a more procyclical" response to the business cycle.  We also find that more transparent and hierarchical budgetary" procedures lead to lower deficits and debt.  Contrary to the findings of Hallerberg and von Hagen" for European countries, we find no evidence that centralized budgetary arrangements neutralize the" potentially adverse impact on fiscal deficits of a larger degree of proportionality of the electoral" system.},
}

@TechReport{bjedov2014impact,
  author={Tjasa Bjedov and Simon Lapointe and Thierry Madiès},
  title={{The Impact of Within-Party and Between-Party Ideological Dispersion on Fiscal Outcomes : Evidence from Swiss Cantonal Parliaments}},
  year=2014,
  month={},
  institution={Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon},
  type={Working Papers},
  url={https://ideas.repec.org/p/gat/wpaper/1435.html},
  number={1435},
  abstract={The impact of the fragmentation of executive and legislative bodies on the level and composition of government expenditure is a political feature that attracted considerable attention from economists. However, previous authors have abstracted from two important concepts : ideology and intra-party politics. In this paper, we explicitly account for these two phenomenons, and make two main contributions. First, we show that both intra-party and interparty ideological dispersion matters in the level of public spending. Therefore, it is incorrect to consider parties as monolithic entities. We also show that ideological dispersion matters especially for current expenditures, and not so much for investment expenditures. To do so, we construct a panel database (2003 to 2011) including data from a survey that quantifies the policy preferences of individual party members that were candidates to federal elections in Switzerland.},
  keywords={Political Fragmentation; Public Spending; Political Parties; Ideology},
  doi={},
}

@article{mukherjee2003politicalparties,
author = {Bumba Mukherjee},
title ={Political Parties and the Size of Government in Multiparty Legislatures: Examining Cross-Country and Panel Data Evidence},
journal = {Comparative Political Studies},
volume = {36},
number = {6},
pages = {699-728},
year = {2003},
doi = {10.1177/0010414003254240},

URL = { 
        https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414003254240
    
},
eprint = { 
        https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414003254240
    
}
,
    abstract = { This article tests the effect of an increase in the number of represented political parties and the size of the majority party on the size of government—proxied by central government expenditure as a percentage of GDP—in multiparty legislatures. The author argues that an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher central government expenditure. Conversely, as the size of the majority party grows from a bare-minimum majority to above the supermajority level, it has a nonlinear, specifically “cube” effect on central government expenditure. Panel data on central government expenditure from 110 countries are used to test these arguments. The results corroborate the theoretical claims and are robust in regression models where fixed-effects were introduced and endogeneity was corrected. Finally, an increase in the number of represented parties leads to higher government spending on subsidies and transfers but to lower spending on public goods. }
}

@Article{lee2015supermajority,
  author={Dongwon Lee},
  title={{Supermajority Rule and the Law of $1/n$}},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year=2015,
  volume={164},
  number={3},
  pages={251-274},
  month={September},
  keywords={Law of 1/n ; Supermajority rule; Budget institutions; Public expenditures; D72; H72},
  doi={10.1007/s11127-015-0271-x},
  abstract={This paper investigates the impact of a supermajority rule on the law of 1/n, which posits that a larger number of districts increases the size of government. Our analysis suggests that supermajority rule, despite the claim that it restrains excessive spending, increases the 1/n effect, because qualified majorities require logrolling to attract additional members. Using data from US states from 1970 to 2007, we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust, worsening effect on the fiscal commons problem identified by the law of 1/n. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015},
  url={https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v164y2015i3p251-274.html}
}

@Article{pecorino2018supermajority,
  author={Paul Pecorino},
  title={{Supermajority rule, the law of 1/n, and government spending: a synthesis}},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year=2018,
  volume={175},
  number={1},
  pages={19-36},
  month={April},
  keywords={Supermajority voting requirement; Law of 1/n; Government spending},
  doi={10.1007/s11127-018-0512-x},
  abstract={Abstract I develop models in which a minimum winning coalition decides on the level of government spending, where the Coase theorem holds amongst members of the winning coalition. An increase in the supermajority requirement has potentially conflicting effects on spending. A higher requirement increases the tax price internalized by the minimum winning coalition, but also increases the number of districts included in this coalition. I develop separate models in which the spending in question consists of (i) a nonexcludable good, (ii) a distributive consumption good, (iii) infrastructure spending and (iv) a transfer payment. A supermajority rule has no effect on spending for nonexcludable goods and ambiguous effects on spending for distributive projects and infrastructure spending. An increased supermajority requirement does unambiguously reduce transfer spending. I also relate the supermajority rule to the law of 1/n. If the Coase Theorem holds and a minimum winning coalition forms, an increase in the number of districts n has precisely the same effect on overall expenditure as a decrease in the supermajority requirement. Thus, the ambiguous spending effects stemming from supermajority rule carry over into this version of the law of 1/n.},
  url={https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v175y2018i1d10.1007_s11127-018-0512-x.html}
}

@article{primo2008distributive,
author = {Primo, David M. and Snyder, James M.},
title = {{Distributive Politics and the Law of $1/n$}},
journal = {The Journal of Politics},
volume = {70},
number = {2},
pages = {477-486},
year = {2008},
doi = {10.1017/S0022381608080444},

URL = { 
        https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608080444
    
},
eprint = { 
        https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608080444
    
}
,
    abstract = { Distributive politics models often predict that legislators will demand inefficiently large projects, with inefficiency increasing in the number of districts, and that this will translate into larger projects and higher spending. The relationship between efficiency and legislature size is often referred to as the “law of 1/n”(Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981). We demonstrate that the “law of 1/n” result with respect to project sizes and total spending is dependent on several factors, including the type of good being provided, the costs of raising revenue, and whether the local government has to share in the project's cost with the central government. In general, the “law of 1/n” need not hold for total government spending, and in fact a “reverse law of 1/n” often holds. In light of our theoretical findings, we reassess the empirical literature on this topic. The results have implications for a wide variety of applications in American and comparative politics. }
}

@ARTICLE{petterssonlidbom2012size,
title = {Does the size of the legislature affect the size of government? Evidence from two natural experiments},
author = {Pettersson-Lidbom, Per},
year = {2012},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
volume = {96},
number = {3},
pages = {269-278},
abstract = {This paper makes use of regression discontinuity designs to estimate the effect of the number of legislators on the size of government. The results indicate a negative effect, i.e., the larger the size of the legislature the smaller is the size of government. This runs counter to conventional wisdom. One potential explanation is that more legislators can better control a budget maximizing bureaucracy. I present evidence that is consistent with the proposed mechanism.},
keywords = {Government spending; Legislature size; Legislative policy-making; Distributive politics; Regression–discontinuity design; Panel data;},
url = {https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:96:y:2012:i:3:p:269-278}
}

@Article{hohmann2017effect,
author="H{\"o}hmann, Daniel",
title="The effect of legislature size on public spending: evidence from a regression discontinuity design",
journal="Public Choice",
year="2017",
month="Dec",
day="01",
volume="173",
number="3",
pages="345--367",
abstract="What is the effect of legislature size on public spending? An answer to this question is provided by Weingast et al. (J Polit Econ 89(4):642--664, 1981), whose ``law of 1/n'' posits that an increase in the number of elected representatives always leads to an increase in public spending. Because elected politicians regard the tax base as a common pool from which they can finance specific projects for their constituencies, and these specific constituencies internalize the full benefits of the projects, but only bear a fraction of the costs (projects are financed from the common tax base), fiscal inefficiency will increase with the number of representatives. In this paper, I test the validity of the ``law of 1/n'' using a dataset of 9325 German municipalities between 2008 and 2010. Through the application of a regression discontinuity design, many of the methodological pitfalls of previous studies can be avoided and a valid estimation of the causal effect of legislature size on public spending for German municipalities can be determined. The results do not corroborate the positive findings of previous studies, which generally supported the implications of the ``law of 1/n''. For the years 2008--2010, I find a negative effect of legislature size on public spending in German municipal councils.",
issn="1573-7101",
doi="10.1007/s11127-017-0484-2",
url="https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0484-2"
}

@article{lewis2019legislature,
author= {Lewis, Blane D.},
title= {Legislature size, local government expenditure and taxation, and public service access in indonesia},
journal= {Studies in Comparative International Development},
year={2019},
volume= {54},
pages= {274--298},
doi= {10.1007/s12116-019-09278-1},
url= "https://rdcu.be/b0w5J"
}

@article{crowley2019law,
author = {Crowley, George R.},
title = {The Law of 1/n Revisited: Distributive Politics, Legislature Size, and the Costs of Collective Action},
journal = {Southern Economic Journal},
volume = {86},
number = {2},
pages = {667-690},
doi = {10.1002/soej.12388},
url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/soej.12388},
eprint = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/soej.12388},
abstract = {The foundational model of distributive politics predicts a positive relationship between the number of legislative districts and the level of inefficiency of projects approved by the legislature—Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen's “Law of 1/n.” This relationship has been tested extensively in the empirical literature, with mixed results. This article presents a model wherein passing the omnibus legislation typical of distributive politics is a costly process. The model predicts a nonlinear relationship between legislature size and spending as increasing the size of the legislature also increases the costs of collective action. Results from an empirical exercise based on U.S. state legislatures (1962–2014) are consistent with the proposed model, showing a 1/n effect which diminishes at the margin as the legislature's size increases, especially in the lower chamber.},
year = {2019}
}

@article{jalil2009politicaleconomics,
author={Jalil, Abdul and Zafarullah, Ahmad},
title = {The political economics of the Malaysian subnational governments’ fiscal behavior},
volume= {16},
number= {1},
year= {2009},
pages = {261--283},
journal = {International Journal of Management Studies},
abstract= {This paper attempts to shed light on the political economy of the Malaysian state governments’ budgetary behavior by tailoring hypotheses drawn from recent theoritical literature to the Malaysian institutional context and testing them empirically. Our main objective here is to examine whether state governments’ fiscal behavior can partly be explained by the political attributes and the institutional characteristics of the government and of the legislature. In particular, we will try to analyze whether the incentives for the state governments to observe a prudent spending behavior have not been undermined by the fact that they have been able to influence relevant central government decisions regarding their finance. Our estimations results show that states that are overrepresented at the executive level tend to have higher spending and deficits. However, we don’t find any correlation between overrepresentation at the Parliament and states governments’ fiscal outcomes. This can be explained by the fact that in Malaysia as is frequently the case in developing nations, the legislature is peripheral to the executive in terms of decision making power.}
}


@article{coate2011government,
Author = {Coate, Stephen and Knight, Brian},
Title = {{Government Form and Public Spending: Theory and Evidence from US Municipalities}},
Journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
Volume = {3},
Number = {3},
Year = {2011},
Month = {August},
Pages = {82-112},
DOI = {10.1257/pol.3.3.82},
URL = {http://www.aeaweb.org/articles?id=10.1257/pol.3.3.82}}


@ARTICLE{schaltegger2009large,
title = {Do large cabinets favor large governments? Evidence on the fiscal commons problem for Swiss Cantons},
author = {Schaltegger, Christoph and Feld, Lars},
year = {2009},
journal = {Journal of Public Economics},
volume = {93},
number = {1-2},
pages = {35-47},
abstract = {The fiscal commons problem is one of the most prominent explanations of excessive spending in political economics. For a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons over the 1980-1998 periods, this paper explores the role of fragmented governments on fiscal policy outcomes. We distinguish between two variants of fragmented governments: cabinet size and coalition size. In addition, we analyze whether constitutional rules for executive and legislature as well as formal fiscal restraints shape the size of government and how different rules interact with fragmentation. The results indicate that the number of ministers in the cabinet is positively associated with the size of government. While fiscal referendums effectively restrict the size of government, there is also evidence that fiscal referendums relax the fiscal commons problem to some extent.},
keywords = {Fragmentation Fiscal policy Referendums Legislative rules Formal fiscal restraints},
url = {https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:93:y:2009:i:1-2:p:35-47}
}

@TechReport{baqir1999districts,
  author={Baqir, Reza},
  title={{Districts, spillovers, and government overspending}},
  year=1999,
  month=Sep,
  institution={The World Bank},
  type={Policy Research Working Paper Series},
  url={https://ideas.repec.org/p/wbk/wbrwps/2192.html},
  number={2192},
  abstract={The author considers the overspending bias in legislatures when the benefits of public policies are concentrated in particular districts but the costs of financing them are spread over the entire political jurisdiction. He formalizes this idea in a simple theoretic framework, in the context of externalities between districts. His main prediction is that greater districting leads to bigger government, but the effects are mitigated if there are positive spillovers of government spending between districts. Institutional forms of government that concentrate decision-making power can curtailthe overspending bias. He presents evidence on these predictions from a cross section of U.S. city governments. His main findings are that: 1) If we take an average city, keep its population and other characteristics constant, but divide it into a greater number of political districts, we get substantially greater government spending per capita. 2) Greater jurisdictional heterogeneity and income equality are associated with bigger government. 3) At-large electoral systems are not less sensitive to overspending than district electoral systems are. 4) Strong-mayor forms of city government, especially those in which mayors have veto power, can curtail the overspending bias. These findings are robust to controlling for socioeconomic characteristics of cities and to alternative measures of government size.},
  keywords={National Governance; Parliamentary Government; Public Sector Economics\&Finance; Environmental Econom},
  doi={},
}

@article{aidt2012distributive,
 ISSN = {19457731, 1945774X},
 URL = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/23249919},
 abstract = {We study the effect of electoral incentives on the allocation of public services across legislative districts. We develop a model in which elections encourage legislators to cater to parochial interests and thus aggravate the common pool problem. Using unique data from seven US states, we study how the amount of funding that a legislator channels to his district changes when he faces a term limit. We find that legislators bring less pork to their district when they cannot seek re-election. Consistent with the Law of 1/N, this last term reduction in funding is smaller in states with many legislative districts.},
 author = {Toke S. Aidt and Julia Shvets},
 journal = {American Economic Journal: Economic Policy},
 number = {3},
 pages = {1--29},
 publisher = {American Economic Association},
 title = {Distributive Politics and Electoral Incentives: Evidence from Seven US State Legislatures},
 volume = {4},
 year = {2012}
}

@article{persson1994centralization,
title = "Does centralization increase the size of government?",
journal = "European Economic Review",
volume = "38",
number = "3",
pages = "765 - 773",
year = "1994",
issn = "0014-2921",
doi = "https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(94)90112-0",
url = "http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0014292194901120",
author = "Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini",
keywords = "Fiscal federalism, Constitutions, Redistribution",
abstract = "Are fiscal programs larger or smaller if they are run centrally, rather than locally, in a prospective federation. We abstract completely from well-understood economic issues and focus instead on the political effects of centralization. For fiscal programs with benefits broadly spread in the population - such as redistributive transfer schemes, social insurance and general government consumption - centralization changes the coalition of voters who favor a large program in a direction that depends on the nature of the redistributive instrument. For fiscal programs with localized benefits-such as provision of local public goods - centralization creates opportunities for rent-seeking, which increases the size of government."
}

@article{stravers2018pork,
author = {Andrew Stravers},
title ={Pork, parties, and priorities: Partisan politics and overseas military deployments},
journal = {Conflict Management and Peace Science},
volume = {0},
number = {0},
pages = {0738894218809702},
year = {0},
doi = {10.1177/0738894218809702},

URL = { 
        https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218809702
    
},
eprint = { 
        https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894218809702
    
}
,
    abstract = { Since the end of World War II, the USA has maintained a sizable military presence around the world. As one of the main mechanisms that the USA uses to exercise its military power abroad, it is a defining characteristic of the international order. Using time-series cross-sectional models and case evidence, I show that, in addition to strategic considerations, the President’s party strength in Congress and the proportion of moderates in the Senate are key determinants of US deployment outcomes. This finding adds to the literature on causes of US troop deployments by examining the incentives for deployments within US politics. }
}

@article{mejia2018agency,

title={Agency Loss and the Strategic Redesign of the Presidential Office in Colombia}, volume={60}, DOI={10.1017/lap.2018.26}, number={3}, journal={Latin American Politics and Society}, publisher={Cambridge University Press}, author={Mejía-Guinand, Luis Bernardo and Botero, Felipe and Solano, Angélica}, year={2018}, pages={96–118}}
